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In supply chain management, information about the downstream party’s willingness to pay (wtp) for a
service or a good sold by an upstream party may not be known to the latter. The seller has to make an
educated guess for the price at which to offer a good or service. If the buyer refuses to buy, the seller can
still turn to a third party and sell at a lower price or hold onto the good. We show that the seller has one
interior profit maximizing price if his Bayesian belief about the buyer’s wtp follows a distribution which has
an increasing failure rate (IFR) in the sense of Barlow and Proschan (1965). We prove that the precision
of information available to the supplier influences the rent distribution and how the downstream party
might opportunistically mis-inform the upstream partner. We propose another reading of the single-price
newsvendor problem in Lariviere and Porteus (2001), Ziya et al. (2004a,b), Paul (2006) or Lariviere (2006).
Our approach applies to all types of mechanism design problems where a profit-maximizing party has to rely
on Bayesian belief to palliate information asymmetry and has alternative sources of income or cost.
Key words : supply chain optimization; Bayesian belief; mechanism design; increasing failure rate
1. Introduction
Motivation for the present paper can be found in the way that some suppliers have to price some
specialized good or service which they sell to some manufacturer. Usually, the supplier can already
sell the same good in different markets for different uses and at different prices. For example, several
dozens of chemical or mineral products have wide ranging applications: calcium carbonate is used in
industries like paint, plastic, rubber, ceramic, cement, glass, steel, oil refining, iron ore purification
and biorock creation for mariculture of sea organisms. Chemical colouring pigments can variously
be used for paint, cosmetic or ink markets. In the garment and apparel industry, a fashion good
can be sold during season in one market but can still be salvaged in another market. In most of the
above instances, the exact relationship between demand in alternative markets and price may not
be known. In fact, the supplier may have to guess at his potential clients’ wtp building upon his
prior knowledge of the industry, the existing competition, alternative sources of supply, etc. This
lack of information may induce unsatisfactory pricing decisions and either unsuccessful offers or
less profitable transaction. On the other hand, the buyer will usually hide or mis-inform the seller
about his wtp. How is the supplier to price his good and what is the effect on the supply chain
efficiency?
We try to answer this question using a mechanism design approach in a games theoretic setting
where a principal wishes to offer a price for some product or service to an agent. If the agent rejects
the offer, the principal is left with the revenue generated from selling to a non-strategic third party.
The seller is in a Bayesian setting of incomplete information and must form a belief about the
agent’s wtp. This belief follows a distribution over a range of possible values.
The model shows how the seller maximizes his profit by his pricing decision and how the buyer
will attempt to increase his rent in detriment of the buyer by keeping information private. The
model implies that joint forecasting and collaboration by the downstream partner will increase the
risk of opportunistic behaviour on the upstream partner’s part.
The present model helps to present in a new light the newsvendor one from Lariviere and Porteus
(2001) in which the single price contract is studied when buyer and seller know of the distribution
of demand and the sensibility to price of this demand. Instead of using the characteristics of the
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increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) as in Lariviere and Porteus (2001), we demonstrate that
the distributions which admit an increasing failure rate (IFR) will enable the principal to enjoy
a concave profit function which admits one optimal solution. The distributions which enjoy this
property include a large variety of classical statistical distributions such as the uniform, normal,
gamma, Weibull, modified extreme value distribution, truncated normal and log normal for most
types of common parameter sets as characterized in Barlow and Proschan (1965)1.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a brief review of existing
literature justifying our approach. The theorem which supports the model is demonstrated in §3. In
§4, we present a second theorem about the properties of IFR distributions. In §5, we illustrate the
use of the theorems with an upstream agent who has to deal with first one and than two downstream
customers. The corresponding insights when comparing an integrated to a decentralized supply
chain management are presented, further illustrated succinctly in §6 before concluding in §7.
2. Literature
To the best of our knowledge, no model addresses and solves such a setting. This problem was
numerically solved in Brusset (2009, 2010) as particular instances of the much broader mechanism
design problem presented here. A similar model is presented in Lariviere (2006), the example
cited is of a service’s pricing. One customer arrives per period, and service takes one period. The
cost of service is zero. Customers privately observe their valuations, which are independent and
identically distributed according to F (X), a cumulative continuous distribution function. A firm
posting price x then faces demand D(x) = F (x), where F (x) = 1−F (x), and sets x to maximize
revenue, Π(x) = xD(x). An optimal price x∗ must solve
Π′(x∗) =D(x∗) +x∗D′(x∗) = F (x∗)(1− g(x∗)) = 0, (1)
when Π′′(x∗)< 0, and where g(x) = xf(x)
F (x)
, the generalized failure rate as defined in Lariviere and
Porteus (2001).
The uniqueness of x∗ depends on the generalized failure rate g(X). In particular, as stated in
Lariviere (2006), if g(X) is increasing, it can equal one at only a single point, and the unique x∗
must solve g(x∗) = 1.
In difference to the model we consider here, the seller is informed of the buyer’s wtp.
The generalized failure rate function has become popular in the last few years in supply chain
management literature, having been cited no less than 55 times as of this writing (source: Google
Scholar). The applications have mostly been in models where demand can be modeled as following
such a distribution. As much as we would like to use and extend the use of such functions in supply
chain management, these distributions have some irksome limitations. As noted in Paul (2005), the
IGFR distributions are not closed under convolutions or shifting which limits their use in supply
chain models where demand among several retailers may have to be aggregated. So even though
the IGFR property is remarkably inclusive, we feel that the robustness and extensibility of the
results warrant a preference for the IFR property. We concur with Paul (2005) in arguing that this
property is of greater use and should demonstrate more practical value in future research than the
IGFR one used in Lariviere (2006).
The models presented in Lariviere and Porteus (2001) or in Ziya et al. (2004a) also involve a
manufacturer selling to a newsvendor given assumptions about demand. The model in Ziya et al.
(2004b) studies the optimal admission price to a service facility for customers who have a known
willingness to pay distribution function.
1 Note that in an IFR distribution FZ(Z) 6= 0 which leads to the notion that FZ(Z)< 1 but can be defined chosen
such that it is arbitrarily close to 1.
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The model in Paul (2006) refines the newsvendor models of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) and
Lariviere (2006) by offering some restrictive conditions so that the manufacturer is guaranteed to
have a unimodal profit function.
Yet in all of the above models, salvage costs, facility capacity cost or overage costs are not
included in the objective functions. So none of these models capture the standard supply chain
management model where the seller may, additionally to selling to his standard customer, salvage,
hold or turn to another customer.
We extend the use of the IFR property first presented in Barlow and Proschan (1965) to the
area of Bayesian statistical inference in decision theory. In our model, a decision maker uses a
estimate based upon a prior descriptive probability model about an unknown piece of information
to maximize his utility. This model has applications within both contract and games theory and
has wide ranging applications in the classical case of a buyer-seller relationship within supply chain
management where the seller has outside opportunities and is uninformed about the buyer’s wtp.
The distributions which have increasing failure rate, also defined a the probability of failure
within a finite interval of time, were first studied extensively in Barlow and Proschan (1965), to
model the reliability of systems and have variously been named hazard rate or failure rate depending
upon the area of research. From Barlow and Proschan (1965), we know that the distributions which
enjoy increasing failure rates include the uniform continuous, gamma, Weibull, modified extreme
value and the truncated normal distributions when their parameters are the commonly accepted
ones. These distributions are of interest in operations and supply chain management research
because of the implications in the evaluation of some types of objective functions which model
stochastic events or Bayesian beliefs. Due to the extensive research in convolution, comparisons,
inequalities, bounds and dominance of IFR distributions (Barlow 2003), arguably further results
should be obtainable in supply chain management and game theoretic research. Tests have been
devised to help determine from a sample of observations whether the underlying population does
have an increasing failure rate.
3. Model
The seller, as principal and Stackelberg leader, is uninformed of the agent’s wtp for a good he
wishes to sell. If he guesses wrongly this level, the seller can still dump his good on a third party
for a price α. The seller has to form a Bayesian belief about the distribution of this wtp.
Let X represent the agent’s wtp as a random variable with distribution F ranging over [X,X],
continuous and twice differentiable. Let f be its probability density. We assume that 0 < X <
X. This distribution’s failure rate function as defined in Barlow and Proschan (1965) is r(X) =
f(X)/F (X). X has an increasing failure rate (IFR) or, equivalently, F is an IFR distribution if
r(X) is weakly increasing for all X such that F (X)< 1. We define α, a real, as the price received
by the principal when the agent refuses the offer.
0<X ≤ α≤X. (2)
Note that if that were not the case, the seller’s belief would have no bearing on his objective
function. If α <X, the maximum revenue for the principal is achieved for him by choosing X as
the offering price. Similarly, if α>X, the principal chooses X.
Tracing a parallel to the model in Lariviere (2006), here the seller also has to sell to a downstream
partner (say a retailer) any quantity at a posted price. However, in our setting, the supplier can
also sell to a third party in the case where the quoted price does not satisfy the buyer. This option
can also be seen as the buyer’s option of returning all unsold goods to the supplier. In Lariviere
(2006), the seller bears no responsibility for the unsold goods and enjoys full information about
the retailer’s demand and retail price.
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Here, the seller does not have information about the buyer’s wtp nor about the competition’s
eventual offer, so the seller must maximize the following objective function
Π(x) = αF (x) +xF (x),
= F (x)(α−x) +x, (3)
after normalizing the cost to 0. The case where α= 0 is the one covered in Lariviere (2006). We
propose to prove that a unique interior point within the range [X,X] does indeed maximize it. We
fist show that the point exists, is a maximum and then prove that it is unique.
3.1. Does the optimal interior point exist?
We now prove that such an optimum exists.
For that, we proceed to prove that {
Π′(X)≥ 0,
Π′(X)≤ 0. (4)
By construction of F (.), even though f(x)> 0 and F (x)< 1, at the limit,{
limx→X Π′(x) = f(X)(α−X) + 1
limx→X Π
′(x) = f(X)(α−X). (5)
For both conditions in (6) to be true, we obtain the following conditions{
X <α+ 1
f(X)
X >α.
(6)
3.2. Is the optimum a maximum?
A property of the increasing failure rate which is of interest in what follows is that
r′(x)≥ 0. (7)
This means that
f ′(x)(1−F (x)) + f(x)2 ≥ 0. (8)
The first order condition (F.O.C.) requires that
Π′(x) = f(x)(α−x) +F (x) = 0. (9)
We describe in the following corollaries the properties of this first differential
Corollary 1. If F is such that F (1) = 1, then x= 1 is solution and is also a maximum because
Π′′(1) < 0. This covers the case when the properties of the IFR distributions cannot be applied
since at x= 1, r(x) is not defined. Similarly, if f(X) = 0, then X is a maximum if X ≤ α because
Π′′(X)≥ 0.
For all cases such that f(x)> 0, we can write the F.O.C. as
α−x=−F (x)
f(x)
. (10)
The second order condition (S.O.C.) for a maximum requires that
Π′′(x) = (α−x)f ′(x)− 2f(x)< 0. (11)
In the case when f(x)> 0, when we replace (α−x) from (10) in (11), we obtain
f(x)Π′′(x) =−r′(x)− f(x)2. (12)
Since f(.) is positive and r(.) is increasing, when the F.O.C. is satisfied, the S.O.C. is also satisfied.
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Corollary 2. Since F is increasing, the domain [X,X] can be truncated at the largest value
x1 for which f(x1) = 0 and set X = x1. So when x=X, Π(x) =X.
By definition of the first differential of the failure rate r′(x)≥ 0. So, because f(x)> 0, R′′(x)< 0.
So, if
∃x0 |Π′(x0) = 0 ⇒ Π′′(x0)< 0. (13)
If a value exists which is an extremum for the objective function, it is a maximum.
Let us now see whether this maximum is unique.
3.3. Is this maximum unique?
Reasoning by the absurd, if
∃(x0, x1)∈ [X,X]2, |x0 <x1, Π′(x0) = Π′(x1) = 0, (14)
then by (13),
Π′′(x0)< 0∧Π′′(x1)< 0. (15)
Since Π(.) is continuous by construction, it decreases for values in the vicinity and above x0, whereas
it increases for values in the vicinity but below x1. Hence, between x0 and x1, R
′(.) changes sign,
so that
∃x2 ∈]x0, x1[, |Π′(x2) = 0,Π′′(x2)≥ 0, (16)
This contradicts (13). Hence there cannot exist another point x1, distinct from x0, for which
Π′(x1) = 0.
We conclude that the point which represents the maximum of the objective function in the
interval [X,X], if it exists, is unique.
All of the above allow us to enunciate the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assuming that F is IFR with a finite support [a, b], then the principal has a unique
optimal solution x∗ to his concave profit function which is solution to
x∗−α= F (x
∗)
f(x∗)
. (17)
Corollary 3. The optimal value is always higher than the outside option price α reflecting the
fact that there is a non-zero probability that the buyer is willing to pay more than α.
4. Properties of IFR distributions and illustration
In this section, we present some useful properties of the IFR distributions. We show some properties
of the addition of distributions and multiplication by a scalar. These properties can be applied
in cases where the upstream party has to price a good or service to several potential customers
involved in different industries and hence where the beliefs about their outside options may be
different. The multiplication by a scalar can allow a principal involved in a multi period game to
update his belief.
Theorem 2. Let F and G two IFR distributions with density resp. f and g then
1. F +G is an IFR distribution.
2. FG is an IFR distribution if gF − fGG≥ 0 and fG− gFF ≥ 0.
Before beginning the proof, note that if F =G then the above condition in 2. becomes 1−F ≥ 0
which is always satisfied.
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Proof of Theorem 2 Let’s introduce the failure rates functions rF (x) =
f(x)
F (x)
, rG(x) =
g(x)
G(x)
,
rF+G(x) =
(f+g)(x)
(F+G)(x)
and rFG(x) =
(fG+Fg)(x)
(FG)(x)
.
1. We notice that
rF+G(x) =
F (x)
F +G(x)
rF (x) +
G(x)
F +G(x)
rG(x). (18)
Then it can be established that
r′F+G(x) =
[ F (x)
F +G(x)
]′
rF (x) +
F (x)
F +G(x)
r′F (x)
+
[ G(x)
F +G(x)
]′
rG(x) +
G(x)
F +G(x)
r′G(x) (19)
where rF , r
′
F , rG, r
′
G,
F
F+G
and G
F+G
are positive functions. So we just have to demonstrate that
[ F (x)
F +G(x)
]′
≥ 0 (20)
and [ G(x)
F +G(x)
]′
≥ 0 (21)
to finish the proof.
[ F
F +G
]′
=
F
′
(F +G)−F (F +G)′
(F +G)2
=
f(F +G) +F (f + g)
(F +G)2
(22)
=
fG+Fg
(F +G)2
≥ 0.
By symmetry we can obtain also [ G
F +G
]′
≥ 0 (23)
such that rF+G(x) is weakly increasing for all x verifying (F +G)(x)< 1.
We now proceed to prove that if F and G are IFR, then FG, the product of F and G, is IFR.
We notice that
rFG(x) =
G(x)F (x)
FG(x)
rF (x) +
F (x)G(x)
FG(x)
rG(x). (24)
Then it can be established that
r′FG(x) =
[G(x)F (x)
FG(x)
]′
rF (x) +
G(x)F (x)
FG(x)
r′F (x)
+
[F (x)G(x)
FG(x)
]′
rG(x) +
F (x)G(x)
FG(x)
r′G(x) (25)
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where rF , r
′
F , rG, r
′
G,
GF
FG
and FG
FG
are positive functions. Further, we have[GF
FG
]′
=
(gF −Gf)FG−GF (FG)′
(FG)2
=
gF −Gf + fFG2 + fFG2
(FG)2
(26)
=
gF − fGG
(FG)2
. (27)
For r′FG ≥ 0, we simply need to demonstrate that :
(gF − fGG)rF +GF FGr′F ≥ 0, (28)
because of the symmetry between G and F .
Using f ′F ≥−f2 from r′F ≥ 0, we can write
(gF − fGG)rF +GF FGr′F =
1
F
[
f(gF − fGG) +GFG(f ′F + f2)
]
=
1
F
[
fgF + f ′FGFG+ f2G(FG−G)
]
=
1
F
[
fgF + f ′FGFG+ f2G2(F
]
≥ 1
F
[
fgF + f2G(GF −FG)
]
(29)
=
1
F
[
fgF − f2GG
]
=
f
F
[
gF − fGG
]
,
which is positive if gF − fGG≥ 0.
Let us illustrate the interest of such a theorem. Consider the case of a supplier who can sell the
same good to either an existing non-strategic customer or to either of two potential customers.
He lacks information about their wtp and so assumes IFR distributions F and G for each with
finite positive supports [XF ,XF ] and [XG,XG] respectively. Both distributions can be designed as
independent without loss of generality. His profit function can be written as
Π(x) = αF (x)G(x) +x
(
F (x)G(x) +G(x)F (x)
)
, (30)
as he sells to either customer if the other does not accept his offer and to the existing non-strategic
partner at α if none of the potential customers accept.
We can hence enounce the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The objective function
Π(x) = αF (x)G(x) +x
(
F (x)G(x) +G(x)F (x)
)
(31)
is strictly concave if F and G are two distributions with IFR and if fG− gFF ≥ 0. The corre-
sponding unique optimal value x∗ is solution to
2x∗− f(x
∗) + g(x∗) +F (x∗)G(x∗) +F (x∗)G(x∗)
f(x∗)G(x∗) + g(x∗)F (x∗)
= α. (32)
Proof of Theorem 3 The proof stems from the application of theorems 1 and 2.
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5. Supply chain performance
Let us compare the performance of this decentralized asymmetric information model with the case
when the same supplier and manufacturer work in the same organization as an integrated supply
chain with a single-price contract. Let Πi represent the integrated channel profit, Πi = Πs + Πm
with the subscript letters s and m representing the profits to the supplier and manufacturer. We
define for this scenario the manufacturer’s selling price of the good or service bought from the
supplier as r, r > 0 and an alternative sourcing price for the same good or service from a non-
strategic third party γ. Each party has the opportunity to source or sell outside the organization if
that opportunity yields a larger overall profit. In this case, the supplier knows the manufacturer’s
wtp and adjusts x∗ = γ so that the parties have the following profits according to the respective
cost of γ and α to the manufacturer.
α≥ γ ⇒

Πm(x) = r− γ,
Πs(x) = α,
Πi = r− γ+α,
α≤ γ ⇒

Πm = r− γ,
Πs = γ,
Πi = r.
(33)
The case where α ≥ γ is a trivial one : if the manufacturer is able to find an alternative source
for the product or service by the supplier which is lower than the alternative selling opportunity
that the supplier faces, both turn to their alternatives and the supply chain’s integrated profit is
enhanced but not based on the integration of that supply chain. In what follows, we focus on α≥ γ.
The interest is to compare the outcome of the integrated supply chain’s profit to the one achieved
by the decentralized one. If the manufacturer accepts the supplier’s offer, it is because γ > x∗,
in which case, the decentralized profit is similar to the integrated case. If γ < x∗, we have as
decentralized profit {
γ < x∗,⇒ Πd = r− γ+α.
γ ≥ x∗ ⇒ Πd = r.
(34)
Hence, we can evaluate the difference between the profit for the supplier in the integrated and
decentralized supply chains as
Πsi−Πsd = γ−αF (x∗)−x∗F (x∗). (35)
This difference tends to 0 as the first moment of F (.) tends to γ and as the second moment tends to
0. In other words, if we consider that the precision of information available is continuous, then as
the seller becomes better informed, the difference between the integrated and decentralized chains
becomes smaller. Given opportunity for mutually beneficial interaction, supply chain efficiency
increases with the availability and precision of information about a buyer’s wtp.
There is another conclusion which can be made from the difference between integrated and
decentralized supply chain rents presented in equation (35). In the decentralized supply chain, the
manufacturer’s rent increases with the standard deviation of the supplier’s belief distribution. In
other words, the manufacturer will tend to refrain from informing or signaling to the supplier about
his true alternative options in the hope that the optimal x∗ will be low compared to his outside
option. The supply chain’s overall rent may be unchanged but the conditions for trust and goodwill
among its members are not favourable. In fact, our result point to active mis-information by the
buyer of his wtp to the seller.
In table 1, we present the values that the parameters of some of the classical IFR distributions
so that the mean converges towards γ and the standard deviation towards 0.
Let us examine how the supplier’s optimal x∗ based upon a belief which follows a Normal IFR
distribution would behave. Suppose that γ = 8 and α= 1. In figure 1 we can see that the optimal
quantity decreases before increasing again as σ decreases. The fact that x∗ is “high” for high
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Table 1 Table of the values to be given to the parameters of the IFR distributions if the belief has to converge
towards the true value of γ
Distribution 1st parameter 2nd parameter
Uniform(a, b) a= b= γ –
Normal(µ,σ) µ= γ σ= 0
Weibull(α,β) β = γ α→∞
Gamma(α,θ) α= γ/θ θ→ 0+
Log Normal(µ,σ) µ=Log(γ) σ→ 0+
Extreme Value(α,β) α= γ β = 0
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Σ
2
4
6
8
x
*
Figure 1 Representation of the optimal solution for the supplier as his information about the true value of the
alternative option to the manufacturer becomes more precise. γ = 8 and the alternative α= 1 in this
example where the belief follows a Normal(8, σ).
values of σ can be put down to the fact that the belief distribution spans an area much larger and
includes a larger probability of values for which the alternative α= 1 is more interesting. In other
words, the alternative becomes a bulwark which helps the supplier in case the manufacturer has
an alternative which is higher than α. The other conclusion is that x∗ converges to γ as σ tends
to 0. The standard deviation of the belief distribution is a proxy to the precision of the supplier’s
information.
6. Numerical illustration
6.1. Illustration of Theorem 1
Let us illustrate the result with with two different distributions. The first is a uniform continuous
distribution on the range [1,8]. The second is an extreme value distribution with parameters with
location parameter α= 1 and scale parameter β = 8. In both cases, the outside option α= 4. The
graphs in figure 2 represent the corresponding profit functions and optimal values x∗.
From Theorem 1, we obtain x∗ = 6 for the uniform distribution and x∗ = 12.9671 for the extreme
value distribution, both of which are higher than the outside option price α = 4 and effectively
represent the maximum of the profit function.
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Figure 2 Representation of the profit function and optimal solution when the belief distribution is uniform and
ranges between 1 and 8 (left graph), when the belief distribution follows an extreme value distribution
(right graph) and α= 4.
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Figure 3 Representation of the profit function and optimal solution when the belief distributions of the two
buyers are uniform continuous supported by [1,8] and [2,10] (left graph), when the belief distributions
follow extreme value distributions {1,8} and {2,10} (right graph) and α= 4.
6.2. Illustration of Theorem 3
In the same way as above, we represent the profit function of a seller who wants to sell the same
good to two different buyers. He forms two Bayesian beliefs about their wtp. In the first case, the
first buyer’s distribution is a uniform continuous distribution supported by [1,8] and the second
is a uniform continuous distribution supported by [2,10]. The outside option of the seller is set at
α= 4.
In the second case,the distributions are extreme value distributions characterized by parameters
{1,8} and {2,10}.
For the uniform continuous distributions, the optimal value is x∗ = 7.4875 and in the extreme
value ones x∗ = 17.231. The plots of the profit functions and corresponding maxima are presented
in figure 3.
7. Conclusion
We prove that for all IFR distributions, and when the range of possible values of the random variable
includes the outside option price α, the objective function of the form Π(x) = αF (x) + xF (x)
admits one single interior maximizing point. This result has applications in operational research
and supply chain management which use game theoretic settings where a Stackelberg leader makes
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a take-it-or-leave-it offer to sell a product or service to the agent relying only upon a Bayesian prior
belief of the agent’s wtp. We prove here that the supply chain rent may be distributed differently
according to the standard deviation of the upstream partner’s belief and give the correspondence
between this belief and the supplier’s rent. As the information about the downstream’s outside
option becomes more precise, the upstream partner is able to increase his share of the supply
chain rent in detriment of the downstream partner. We suggest that the conditions for deliberate
disinformation by the upstream partner as to his outside options are thus given.
We extend the results to the case of the seller who sells one good and makes offers to two
buyers without knowing their wtp. We show that if the buyer’s outside option price is included
within the supporting ranges of the two potential buyers’ Bayesian belief distributions and if
these distributions have IFR, the seller’s profit function is strictly concave and admits one optimal
solution under mild constraints on the two distributions.
These results can be applied to repeated games in which case the new range distribution depends
upon Bayesian updating with cutoff (Hart and Tirole 1988).
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